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1. Introduction 
 
Imposing a tax on an environmentally harmful commodity is widely known to be beneficial 
from an efficiency point of view. According to Sandmo (1975), commodity tax on a good 
creating a harmful externality should appear additively only in the tax rate of that good, not 
in other commodities’ tax rates. This is a so called additivity property, which was later 
shown to be a special case of Dixit’s principle of targeting (Dixit, 1985). Imposing a tax on 
an environmentally harmful good is argued to create a double dividend, i.e. in addition to 
diminishing pollution, the tax revenues can be used to replace more distorting taxes and 
thus improve economy’s efficiency. An excellent survey on the double dividend created by 
environmental taxation is presented in Goulder (1995).  
 
There are two important aspects the government needs to take into account when designing 
the optimal tax policy for environmentally harmful goods: efficiency and income 
distribution.  The efficiency objective is examined in a representative consumer economy 
e.g. in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994). The 
result that environmental taxes tend to be regressive (Smith, 1992; Harrison, 1994) draws 
attention to redistributional issues. The first study combining environmental taxation with 
redistributional objectives is Sandmo (1975), which analysed the structure of commodity 
taxation. This issue is discussed also in Pirttilä and Schöb (1996), who use an assumption 
of optimal linear taxation in their work. 
 
Instead of linear taxation it is more realistic to assume a non-linear income tax and linear 
commodity tax. This mixed taxation case used in this work is introduced in Mirrlees (1976) 
and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Environmental and redistributional objectives are 
combined in a mixed tax framework in Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997).  
  
This study combines two usual market failures, externalities and imperfect information. It 
is based on a model of a two type economy, first introduced in Stiglitz (1982) and Stern 
(1982). This framework was developed further in Boadway and Keen (1993) and Edwards, 
Keen and Tuomala (1994). There are two different types of households varying by their 
abilities and the government needs to take the incentive constraint into account in designing 
the tax scheme.  
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The extension used in this study concerns factor price determination. Instead of assuming 
that wages are determined ex ante here wages are let to adjust endogenously. This 
assumption turns out to have an essential effect on well known results like Atkinson’s and 
Stiglitz’s result of redundancy of commodity taxation or Diamond’s and Mirrlees’s result 
of production efficiency. Both these results no longer hold when endogenous wages are 
introduced (see e.g. Naito, 1999; Gaube, 2001; Micheletto, 2001).   
 
The aim of this study1 is to analyse the optimal tax policy in the presence of an externality. 
In the background there are assumptions that the government aims at small income 
differences and a clean environment and it is restricted by self-selection constraint. The 
model is similar to the one in Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994) and Pirttilä and Tuomala 
(1997) with a distinction of an assumption of endogenous wages.  
 
The paper is constructed as follows. In section 2 the model and the maximization problem 
are introduced. Also the first order conditions defining the optimal tax policy are 
calculated. In section 3 the social valuation of the externality is defined. There appears to 
be a controversy between environmental and redistributional objectives in the terms 
indicating the externality’s effect on consumers. However the term demonstrating the 
impact of the externality on the labour markets (i.e. indirectly on both consumers and 
producers) implies that both of the government’s goals are in accordance. Section 4 the 
marginal effective tax rates for both types of households are determined. It turns out that 
they differ from the ones in the exogenous wage case only by a couple of extra terms 
indicating the indirect effect of the externality on the wage rate. The optimal commodity 
tax is calculated in section 5. It is shown that Dixit’s “principle of targeting” continues to 
hold despite of the assumption of endogenous wages. In section 6 there is a brief analysis 
of the externality’s effect on public good provision. Finally section 7 concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This is a preliminary version of the study, a more extensive analysis is coming soon.   
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2. The Model 
 
In this framework there are assumed to be two types of households with similar preferences 
but different productivities. Type 1 households have lower productivity and type 2 
households supply labour with higher productivity. Wages are assumed to be determined 
endogenously, although without a loss of generality it can be assumed that w2 > w1 , i.e. the 
wage rate of a high productivity type household is greater than the wage rate of low 
productivity households. The wage rate ratio is defined as 2
1
w
w=Ω . 
 
The households earn a labour income equal to Y , where Lhhh Lw= h denotes the labour 
supply of type h, h = 1,2. Labour income is taxed by an optimal, non-linear income tax 
scheme T(Yh) such that the after-tax income is ( )hYT−hh YB = . The whole after-tax 
income is consumed on two goods Xi ,  I = c,d. The goods are produced with a production 
function ( )EGLLF ,,, 21 2, where 0>=∂∂ hh wLF , 0>∂∂GF , G denotes the public good 
and 0<∂
∂
E
F . There is also a commodity tax ti , i = c,d  such that the consumer prices are 
denoted by a vector Q , where 


d
c
t
t+

=

=
d
c
d
c
p
p
q
q
Q . The constraint that households use 
all their net income into consumption implies that  ∑ =
i
hh
ii BXq ,  i = c,d. Consumers’ 
maximization of direct utility U conditional on budget constraint defines the indirect utility 
function ( ) ∑ = i ii BXqE= Xhh GwYXUEGBQV ,,,max,,, hL , , where E denotes the 
externality and G is the public good.  
 
Good Xc is a “clean” good, whereas good Xd is a “dirty” good creating a harmful externality 
on the environment. The source of the externality E is the aggregate consumption of the 
dirty good,  
                                                 
2 The production function is assumed to have constant returns of scale and it is also assumed to be possible to 
tax the profits with 100 percent tax rate.  
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( ).,,,,∑=
h
hhh
d EGLBQXE           eq. 1 
 
In this framework the government produces a public good G and collects tax revenues from 
a non-linear income tax and linear commodity taxation. The planner has both 
environmental and redistributive objectives. The governments’ budget constraint3 requires 
that 
  
( )
( ) ( ) ,,,,,,,, 21 ∑∑
∑ ∑
=−
⇔=

 +
h t
hh
ii
h
ii
h
rGEGLBQXpEGLLF
rGXtYT
h i           eq. 2 
i.e. the sum of the tax revenues equals the price of public good provision.  
 
Government’s problem is to maximize the low ability type’s utility given the level of type 2 
utility. However, the government cannot distinguish the ability of a worker, thus the 
income tax must be defined by labour income. Because of this the government is restricted 
by a self-selection constraint, i.e. both household types must prefer to select the labour-
taxation combination meant for them instead of mimicking the choice of the other type. 
Here it is concentrated on the situation, where the self-selection constraint binds only type 
2 households4. The constraint can be written as 
 
 ( ) ( ),,,,,ˆ,,,, 112222 EGLBQVEGLBQV Ω≥          eq. 3 
where the hat term V refers to the indirect utility of the mimicker. δ, λ, γ and µ are the 
lagrange multipliers for the Pareto constraint, the self-selection constraint, the 
government’s budget constraint and the constraint defining the effect of the externality  
respectively. The Lagrange function of the government’s optimization problem is 
2ˆ
                                                 
3 Government’s budget constraint can be rewritten with the help of the consumer’s budget constraint: 
 
( ) ,∑ =


 ∑ ∑++−→
=∑ 


 ∑+−→=∑ 


 ∑+


h
rG
t t
h
iXitiXitip
hY
rG
h t
h
iXit
hBhYrG
h t
h
iXit
hYT
and ( )EGLLFY
h
h ,,, 21=∑ . 
4 The analysis would be analogous if the self-selection constraint bounded only low productivity households. 
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( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
( ) .,,,,
,,,,,,,
,,,,ˆ,,,,
,,,,,,,,
21
112222
2222111


 −+


 −−+
Ω−+
−+=Ψ
∑
∑∑
h
hhh
d
h
hh
i
h
ii
EGLBQXE
rGEGLBQXpEGLLF
EGLBQVEGLBQV
VEGLBQVEGLBQV
µ
γ
λ
δ
        eq. 4 
The planner maximizes this function with respect of Bh, Lh, commodity tax rate tj and E. 
The first order conditions with respect to these variables are 
 
L1: 0ˆ 1
1
1
1
1
1
121 =∂
∂−



∂
∂−+


∂
Ω∂+Ω− ∑ LXLXpwLLVV dii iLL µγλ          eq. 5 
 
B1: 0ˆ 1
1
1
1
21 =∂
∂−∂
∂−− ∑ BXBXpVV di iiBB µγλ            eq. 6 
 
L2: ( ) 0ˆ 2
2
2
2
2
2
122 =∂
∂−



∂
∂−+∂
Ω∂−+ ∑ LXLXpwLLVV di iiLL µγλλδ          eq. 7 
 
B2: ( ) 02
2
2
2
2 =∂
∂−∂
∂−+ ∑ BXBXpV di iiB µγλδ            eq. 8 
 
tj: ( ) 0ˆ 2221 =∂∂−∂∂−−++ ∑∑∑ h j
h
d
h i j
h
j
iqqqq t
X
t
X
pVVVV µγλδ                            eq. 9 
 
E: 
( )
,01
ˆˆ 12221
=



∂
∂−+



∂
∂−+



∂
Ω∂+−++
∑∑∑
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iE
LEEE
E
X
E
X
pF
E
LVVVV
µγ
λλδ
                   eq. 10 
 
where the subscripts L, B and E refer to the derivatives with the corresponding argument, 
and the subscript q denotes the derivative with respect to the price vector Q .  
 
 6 
  
3. Valuation of the externality 
 
The shadow price, i.e. the valuation of the externality will be shown to be an essential part 
of our results. The form we use here is γ
µ , the shadow price of the externality relative to 
government’s tax revenue. To find an expression for the term, add and subtract 1
1
2ˆ
B
E
B V
VVλ  
from equation 10 to get 
 
( ) ( )
.01ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆˆ
12
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
21
=



∂
∂−+



∂
∂−+∂
Ω∂−



 −−++−
∑∑∑
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iEL
B
E
B
E
B
B
E
B
B
E
BB
E
X
E
XpF
E
LV
V
V
V
VV
V
VV
V
VVV
µγλ
λλδλ
         eq. 11 
Let h
B
h
Eh
EB V
VMWP −=  denote the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality. 
Plugging this into the previous equation yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
.01ˆ
ˆˆˆ
12
12222121
=



∂
∂−+



∂
∂−+∂
Ω∂−
−++−−−
∑∑∑
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iEL
EBEBBEBBEBBB
E
X
E
XpF
E
LV
MWPPWMVMWPVMWPVV
µγλ
λλδλ
         eq. 12 
Substituting in the first order conditions 6 and 8 we get 
 
( )
.01
ˆˆˆ 12122
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
=



∂
∂−+



∂
∂−+
∂
Ω∂−−+




∂
∂+∂
∂−



∂
∂+∂
∂−
∑∑∑
∑∑
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iE
LEBEBB
EB
d
t
i
iEB
d
t
i
i
E
X
E
X
pF
E
LVMWPPWMV
MWP
B
X
B
X
pMWP
B
X
B
X
p
µγ
λλ
µγµγ
        eq. 13 
 
Next we use the Slutsky-type property of the conditional demand function to simplify the 
equation further. The conditional demand function  is obtained by minimizing the 
consumer’s cost and keeping the utility constant.  We know that the conditional demand 
h
ix
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function satisfies the property5 
B
XMWP
E
x
E
X hih
EB
h
i
h
i
∂
∂−∂
∂=∂
∂
.  It has also been shown in 
Edwards et al. (1994) that 
E
x
tMWP
E
x
p
h
i
i i
i
h
EB
h
i
i ∂
∂−=∂
∂∑ . Substituting these in and using 
a definition 
∑
γ
λλ
2ˆ
* B
V=  equation 13 becomes 
( )
.01ˆ
ˆ*
12
12
2
2
2
1
1
1
=







∂
∂−∂
∂−+−∂
Ω∂−∂
∂+
+−+∂
∂−∂
∂−
∑∑∑∑
h
h
dh
EB
h
d
h
h
EBL
h i
h
i
i
EEBEB
d
EB
d
EB
B
X
MWP
E
x
MWP
E
LV
E
x
t
FMWPPWM
B
XMWP
B
XMWP
γ
µ
γ
λ
λγ
µ
γ
µ     eq. 14 
 
The equation above simplifies further to 
 
( )
.ˆ
ˆ
*
ˆ*1
1
2
2
12
∑∑
∑∑
∂
∂−∂
Ω∂+−
−−=



∂
∂−
h i
h
i
i
B
L
E
EBEB
h
h
EB
h
h
d
E
xt
E
L
V
VF
MWPPWMMWP
E
x
λ
λγ
µ
                 eq. 15 
 
And thus the shadow price can be written as 
( ) ,ˆˆ*ˆ* 12212 


∂
∂−∂
Ω∂+−−−= ∑∑∑
h i
h
i
i
B
L
EEBEB
h
h
EB E
xt
E
L
V
VFMWPPWMMWP λλσγ
µ  eq. 16 
               term Cd                term Ci             term Pd       term LM            term  Gi             
.
1
1
∑ ∂∂−
=
h
h
d
E
x
whereσ  
The coefficient σ is an environmental feedback parameter. It has been shown that the 
feedback parameter must be positive to assure that the model is stable (Sandmo, 1980). The 
terms in brackets are divided into terms concerning consumers (C), producers (P), the 
labour markets (LM) and the government (G) and subscript d refers to direct effects and 
subscript i to indirect effects.  
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5 Edwards et al. (1994) show this for a public good and the proof is analogous for a public bad as well. 
  
The first term in the brackets, Cd, describes the direct harmful effect of the externality on 
consumers. The sign of the sum of the marginal willingnesses to pay to avoid the 
externality is positive. The shadow price is affected indirectly by the self-selection 
constraint Ci. Its sign depends on the difference in valuation of the externality between true 
type 1 and a mimicker. Marginal willingness to pay can be assumed to be the larger the 
more household has leisure (when environmental quality and leisure are complements6). 
Since mimicker is of the high ability type, he can do the work of type 1 in a shorter time 
than a true low ability type worker, and thus he has more leisure. Using this conclusion, the 
MWPEB is larger for mimicker than for type 1 household and the term has a negative effect 
on the shadow price of the externality. This means that since mimickers are willing to pay 
more than true type 1 workers to avoid the externality, reducing the level of the externality 
increases the desirability of mimicking and thus forces the government to decrease the level 
of the income redistribution. Thus environmental objectives and aims regarding to income 
distribution seem to be in discrepancy with respect to this term7.  
  
In the production side the direct effect Pd increases the shadow price, as the derivative of 
the production function with respect to the externality was assumed to be negative. The 
indirect effect to the producer side comes from the labour market term LM as a result of 
wage adjustment8. λ*, L1 and V are positive. V  is mimicker’s marginal utility from 
labour, and it is negative. Thus the sign of LM term depends on the last part, the partial 
derivative of the wage rate with respect to the externality.  
2ˆ
B
2ˆ
L
 
Since ( )( ) ( )( )ELLF ELLFLELLF LELLFww ,, ,,,, ,, 212
21
1
221
121
2
1
=∂∂
∂∂==Ω , the partial derivative is 
                                                 
6 The opposite case, where environmental quality and leisure are substitutes, would go in an analogous way. 
However, this possibility seems less likely than complementarity of leisure and environmental quality. 
 
7 In the consumer side there are two indirect effects, one comes from the self-selection constraint and the 
other from the labour market effect as the wages adjust. It turns out that the sign of the labour market effect is 
most plausibly positive, so these two effects have opposite signs and as a whole the direction of the indirect 
effect in the consumer side remains ambiguous.  
 
8 In the labour market term the partial derivative of the wage ratio with respect to the externality ΩE affects 
both consumers and producers.  
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 ( )
( ),1 21
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1221
EE
EEEEEE
E
E
w
F
w
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
FFFF
E
ξξ −Ω=


 −Ω=


 −=−=Ω=∂
Ω∂
        eq. 17 
where the subscripts refer to the partial derivatives. Thus the sign of ΩE is determined by 
ξ1E and ξ2E, the elasticities of wages with respect to the externality. Assuming pollution to 
have a negative effect on productivity, these elasticities are negative. ΩE is negative, when 
EE 21 ξξ > . This means that type 1 worker’s productivity and wage increases more than 
type 2’s productivity as the level of pollution is decreased9. If the elasticity for type 2 is 
greater (in absolute terms) then the sign of ΩE is positive. It is plausible to think that the 
low ability workers could be more vulnerable to pollution than the high ability workers (for 
example because with lower income level they cannot afford to protect themselves from the 
pollution). Thus the externality is here assumed to have a negative effect on wage ratio. 
Assuming that ΩE is negative means that the term LM is positive and it has an increasing 
effect on the shadow price. 
  
Negative ΩE means that when the government seeks to lessen the level of pollution, the 
wage ratio Ω rises. As Ω gets closer to 1, wage differences decrease. Smaller wage 
differences mitigate the self-selection constraint and allow the low ability type to earn 
more. This in turn leads to lower need for income transfers. Thus the taxation of a high 
ability type can be decreased and both types are better off. The income distribution target is 
in that case in accordance with environmental targets. If the effect of the externality on the 
wage ratio is positive, the government redistributing income and preferring environmental 
quality ends up in a trade off situation. Emphasizing the environmental target worsens the 
wage ratio, encourages mimicking and thus has on the other hand a negative effect on 
welfare. 
 
The last term in equation 16, Gi refers to the externality’s indirect effect on government’s 
tax revenues. It tells how much government’s tax revenues from commodity taxation 
change due to the externality affecting the demand for goods. When an increased pollution 
                                                 
9 The reasoning is the same in the case where the effect of the externality on productivity is positive (although 
this kind of situation is hard to imagine). ΩE is positive, if type 2 worker suffers more from the increased 
amount of the externality. The other possibilities are that ξ1E < 0 and ξ2E > 0, when ΩE is always negative, and 
in the opposite case it is always positive. 
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level decreases the demand for goods, the tax revenue effect has a negative sign and term 
Gi increases the shadow price. In the opposite case the effect is of course the other way 
around.  
 
When the level of the externality decreases the demand for other goods there will appear a 
double dividend. From the government’s point of view it is advantageous to try to reduce 
the level of pollution because it would mean not only better environmental quality but also 
higher tax revenues from commodity taxes. Equivalently when the externality deters 
mimicking environmental policy leads to both less pollution and higher utility for workers 
as a result of mitigated self-selection constraint. 
 
As a whole, the sign of the shadow price is ambiguous. Both of the direct effects increase 
the shadow price implying the harmfulness of the externality. The indirect effects are in 
turn less straight forward to interpret. In the consumer side the indirect effect of the self-
selection constraint was assumed to be negative: aim to contribute the redistribution 
increases the shadow price and worsens the environmental quality. However, the labour 
market effect e.g. an indirect effect on both producers and consumers, is more plausible to 
believe to have a positive influence on the shadow price. This means that both 
environmental objectives and redistributional goals are in agreement with each other.  
 
However, assuming that the externality is socially harmful would indicate that the shadow 
price must be positive. In the following discussion it will be assumed that the externality is 
harmful and its valuation is positive. On the other hand, it should be noted, that this is not 
the only conclusion that can be made. If the presence of the externality discourages 
mimicking such that term Ci is sufficiently large and/or it increases the tax revenues by 
boosting the demand of goods, it is possible that the shadow price is negative. This implies 
that the externality would in this case actually be socially beneficial. 
 
Assume now as a special case of the former analysis that the externality affects only 
consumers, i.e. pollution does not influence the production at all. Term Pd in equation 16 
would become zero, and the shadow price would reduce to 
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( ) .ˆˆ*ˆ* 12212 



∂
∂−∂
Ω∂+−−= ∑∑∑
h i
h
i
i
B
L
EBEB
h
h
EB E
xt
E
L
V
VMWPPWMMWP λλσγ
µ      eq. 18 
The sign of the shadow price remains ambiguous, as the first and the third terms are 
positive, second term is negative and the sign of the tax revenue term depends on the 
externality’s effect on demand of goods. As earlier, the term referring to the difference 
between mimicker’s and true low productivity type is negative implying inconsistency 
between environmental and distributional objectives.  
  
Another special case is to assume that the externality affects only in firms’ production but 
not the consumer’s utilities10. Now terms Cd and Ci are zero and the valuation of the 
externality can be written as 
 .ˆ
ˆ
* 1
2
2



∂
∂−∂
Ω∂+−= ∑∑
h i
h
i
i
B
L
E E
xt
E
L
V
VF λσγ
µ          eq. 19 
 
The two first terms were assumed to be positive and if the externality decreases the demand 
for goods, also the last term has an increasing effect on the shadow price. In this case the 
shadow price would be unambiguously positive implying the harmfulness of the 
externality. Investing on reducing the amount of the externality is profitable as improving 
environmental quality also promotes distributional aims.  
 
4. Effective marginal tax rates 
 
In this model the tax system consists of a direct income tax and an indirect commodity tax. 
The total tax paid by a worker is the sum of these two taxes ( ) ( ) ∑+=
t
ii XtYTYτ . The 
effective marginal tax rate (MTR) can be found by differentiating total taxes with respect to 
income Y. The differentiation yields11 
                                                 
10 However, through the labour market term the externality would affect consumers also in this case as a 
result of endogenous wages. 
11 Here the results '  and 1)( T
Y
BYTYB −=∂
∂→−=
wY
LwL 1=Y ∂
∂→=  are used.  
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 ( ) ( ) .1'1'' ∑ 



∂
∂+−∂
∂+=
i
i
i
i
i wL
X
T
B
XtTYτ           eq. 20 
The marginal income tax rate is derived as a result of households’ optimization problem 
where the indirect demand function ( )EGLBQh ,,,,V  is maximized subject to the budget 
equation ( )hhh YTYB −= . The resulting condition is   
 .'11'
B
L
B
L
wV
VT
wV
VT −=−→+=           eq. 21 
Substituting the previous condition into equation 20 the effective MTR for type i becomes 
 
.111
11'
∑∑
∑
∂
∂+


∂
∂−+=




∂
∂+∂
∂−++=
i
i
ii
i
i
i
B
i
L
i
i
i
B
i
Li
i
B
i
Li
L
Xt
wB
Xt
Vw
V
wL
X
Vw
V
B
Xt
Vw
Vτ
         eq. 22 
 
The commodity tax rate ti is the difference between the producer price pi and the consumer 
price qi: . The conditional demand functions Xiii ptq += i satisfy the adding-up 
conditions 1=∂
∂∑
i
i
i B
Xq  and 0=∂
∂∑
i
i
i Y
Xq . Since Y = wL, 
wL
X
Y
X ii 1
∂
∂=∂
∂
 and the second 
adding up condition can be written as ∑ =∂∂i ii L
Xq
w
01 . Taking these properties into 
account equation 22 becomes 
 
.1
11'



∂
∂−∂
∂+=
∂
∂−∂
∂+=
∑∑
∑∑
i
i
i
i
i
i
B
Li
i
i
i
ii
i
i
i
B
i
Li
L
Xp
B
Xp
V
Vw
w
L
X
p
wB
X
p
Vw
Vτ
         eq. 23  
 
To find an expression for the second term in the right hand side divide equation 7 by 
equation 8. By rearranging the expression we get  
.ˆ 2
12
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
L
LV
B
X
V
V
L
X
L
X
pw
B
X
p
V
V
L
d
B
Ld
i
i
i
i
i
i
B
L
∂
Ω∂+



∂
∂−∂
∂+



∂
∂−−=∂
∂ ∑∑ λγµ         eq. 24 
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Plugging this back into equation 23 the effective marginal tax rate for type 2 becomes 
 .ˆ
ˆ
*1' 2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 



∂
Ω∂+



∂
∂−∂
∂=
L
L
V
V
B
X
V
V
L
X
w B
Ld
B
Ld λγ
µτ          eq. 25 
        term A2                    term B2 
 
The effective marginal tax rate of type 2 consists of two terms A2 and B2 (subscript refers to 
worker’s type). Assuming that the shadow price of the externality is positive and that i
B
i
L
V
V is 
negative, term A2 is positive when the dirty good is a normal good and a substitute with 
leisure12.  This term describes the effect of the externality: if there were no externality, the 
shadow price would be zero and the whole term would vanish. The term B2 captures the 
effect of endogenous wages. Since 2L∂
Ω∂ is positive and 
2
2
ˆ
ˆ
B
L
V
V is negative, the sign of term B2 
is negative. This implies that letting the wage rates adjust endogenously decreases the 
marginal tax rate of a high ability person.   
 
Equivalently the effective marginal tax rate for type 1 can be determined by calculating an 
expression for the second term in equation 23. Dividing the first order conditions, equation 
5 by equation 6, and rearranging yields  
 
.ˆ
ˆˆ
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1



 −


∂
Ω∂+Ω+




∂
∂−∂
∂+



∂
∂−−=∂
∂ ∑∑
B
L
B
L
B
d
B
Ldi
i
i
i
i
i
B
L
V
V
L
L
V
VV
B
X
V
V
L
X
L
X
pw
B
X
p
V
V
γ
λ
γ
µ
        eq. 26 
 
Plugging this into equation 23 gives the effective marginal tax rate of type 1: 
.ˆ
ˆ
*ˆ
ˆ
*1' 1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1




∂
Ω∂+


 −Ω+



∂
∂−∂
∂=
L
L
V
V
V
V
V
V
B
X
V
V
L
X
w B
L
B
L
B
Ld
B
Ld λλγ
µτ            eq. 27 
                                                 
12 When the dirty good is normal and complement with leisure, the first derivative in term A2 is negative and 
the second part is positive, and the sign of the term remains ambiguous.   
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The first term in the brackets can be rewritten by adding and subtracting a term 
( )Ω−1ˆ 2LVγ
λ  as 
 
( ) ( )
( ).1ˆ
ˆ
*ˆ
ˆ
*ˆˆˆˆ
1ˆ1ˆˆˆˆ
ˆ
*
2
2
1
1
2
2
2222
1
1
222
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
Ω−−


 −=


 Ω+−+−=



 Ω−−Ω−+−Ω=


 −Ω
B
L
B
L
B
L
LLLB
B
L
LLB
B
L
L
B
L
B
L
V
V
V
V
V
VVVVV
V
V
VVV
V
VV
V
V
V
V
λλγ
λ
γ
λλ
            eq. 28 
 
So the effective MTR for type 1 becomes 
( ) .1ˆ
ˆ
*ˆ
ˆ
*ˆ
ˆ
*1'
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1



 Ω−−


 −+∂
Ω∂+



∂
∂−∂
∂=
B
L
B
L
B
L
B
Ld
B
Ld
V
V
V
V
V
V
L
L
V
V
B
X
V
V
L
X
w
λλλγ
µτ    eq. 29 
                 term A1                  term B1             term C1             term D1  
 
Now the effective marginal tax rate for the low ability person is determined by four terms. 
The two first terms, A1 and B1 correspond to the ones of high ability person, the only 
difference is, that here 1L∂
Ω∂  is negative and thus term B1 is positive. Term C1 defines the 
effect of the self-selection constraint. By agent monotonicity13 this term is positive. Term 
D1 is an outcome of the endogenous wages and it is positive. Thus the effective marginal 
tax rate of the low ability type is strictly positive when the dirty good is normal and a 
substitute with leisure.    
 
In conclusion from equations 25 and 29 it seems like the effect of endogenous wages 
decreases the effective MTR of the more productive worker (terms B1 and D1) and raises 
the effective MTR of the low productive worker (term B2). If there were no externality, 
terms A1 and A2 would disappear from the equations of effective MTRs. In other words, 
when the dirty good is a normal good and a substitute with leisure, presence of externalities 
increases effective MTR. This result is in accordance with Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) with 
                                                 
13 The agent monotonicity condition implies that i
B
i
L
V
V
decreases with productivity.  
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the distinction that here it needs to determined whether the dirty good is a substitute or a 
complement with leisure in order to find out the sign of the partial derivative h
h
d
L
X
∂
∂
.  
 
However, these results of marginal tax rates don’t give enough information to say anything 
about the income tax level. The income tax may rise or fall due to the externality in the 
endogenous wages’ framework.  
 
5. Commodity Taxation  
 
The optimal commodity taxation rule can be derived from the first order condition with 
respect to the tax rate tj.  As a result of using Roy’s identity equation 9 can be written as 
( ) .0ˆˆ 222211 =∂
∂−∂
∂−−+−− ∑∑∑
h j
h
d
h i j
h
j
ijBjBjB t
X
t
X
pXVXVXV µγλλδ             eq. 30 
 
By differentiating consumer’s budget constraint ∑ =
i
iii BXq with respect to qj we get a 
condition 0=+∂
∂
j
i j
i
i Xt
Xq∑ . Plugging this in and doing some rearrangements yields 
( )[ ] .ˆˆ1
,0
222211
jBjBjB
h
h
jj
h j
h
d
h t j
h
j
ij
XVXVXVXwhere
t
X
t
X
t
λλδγφ
γ
µφ
−+++−=
=∂
∂−∂
∂+
∑
∑∑∑
        eq. 31 
Term jφ  includes the elements from equation 30 not referring to the externality. Pirttilä and 
Tuomala (1997) define this term as the public finance part of commodity tax tj. This part of 
commodity taxation thus remains unchanged even if the externality disappears.  
 
Equation 31 can also be given in a matrix form: 
               .








∂
∂+
∂
∂+
=










∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∑
∑
∑∑
∑∑
h d
h
d
d
h c
h
d
c
d
c
h d
h
d
h d
h
c
h c
h
d
h c
h
c
q
X
q
X
t
t
q
X
q
X
q
X
q
X
γ
µφ
γ
µφ
                        eq. 32 
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Denoting the determinant of the coefficient matrix in the left by J and utilizing Cramer’s 
rule we can solve commodity taxes separately for goods c and d: 
∑ 



∂
∂−∂
∂=
h c
h
d
d
d
h
d
cc q
X
q
X
J
t φφ1                 eq. 33 
.1 γ
µφφ +



∂
∂−∂
∂= ∑
h c
h
d
d
d
h
d
cd q
X
q
X
J
t                    eq. 34 
 
These equations are exactly the same as in the case of exogenous wages. Dixit’s (1985) 
general result of “principle of targeting” continues to hold also under the assumption of 
endogenous wages. The part of the commodity tax indicating the harmfulness of the 
externality γ
µ  appears only in the tax rate of the dirty good. The more specific result is 
Sandmo’s additivity property, which states that the term connected to the harmful 
externality appears additively in the tax rate of the dirty good.  
 
The assumption of the endogeneity of wages doesn’t seem to affect commodity taxation at 
all. This outcome is not a surprise since the reason why endogeneity changed the equations 
of the shadow price or marginal tax rates was a result of the nonlinear technology and self-
selection constraints, which do not appear in commodity taxation.  
   
6. Public Expenditure 
 
The condition for an optimal production of the public good can be derived by taking a first 
order condition from equation 4 with respect to G:  
 
( ) .ˆˆ 12221 ∑∑∑ ∂∂−


 +∂
∂−+


∂
Ω∂+−++=∂
Ψ∂
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iGLGGG G
X
r
G
X
pF
G
LVVVV
G
µγλλδ   eq. 35 
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The manipulation goes exactly as in determining the shadow price for the externality. First 
the term 1
1
2ˆ
B
E
B V
VVλ  is added and subtracted in equation 35. After some rearranging and using 
a definition of marginal rate of substitution h
B
h
Gh
GB V
VMRS = we get 
( ) ( ) ( )
.0
ˆˆˆ 1212222121
=∂
∂−


 +∂
∂−+
∂
Ω∂−−−++−
∑∑∑
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iG
LGBGBBGBBGBBB
G
Xr
G
XpF
G
LVMRSSRMVMRSVMRSVV
µ
λλλδλ
           eq. 36 
 
Substituting the first order conditions 6 and 8 in equation 36 and dividing it by γ yields 
( )
.0ˆ
ˆ
*
ˆ*
1
2
2
12
∑∑∑
∑∑ ∑
=∂
∂−−∂
∂−+∂
Ω∂−
−−∂
∂+∂
∂
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iG
B
L
h i h
GBGB
h
GB
h
dh
GB
h
i
i
G
X
r
G
X
pF
G
L
V
V
MRSSRMMRS
B
X
MRS
B
X
p
γ
µλ
λγ
µ
              eq. 37 
Using similar properties as earlier, 
B
XMWP
G
x
G
X hih
GB
h
i
h
i
∂
∂−∂
∂=∂
∂
 and 
 
G
x
tMWP
G
x
p
h
i
i i
i
h
GB
h
i
i ∂
∂−=∂
∂∑ ∑ , the equation above becomes  
 
( ) .ˆˆ*ˆ* 12212 GLVVGXGXtFMRSSRMr
MRS
B
L
h
h
d
h i
h
i
iGGBGB
h
h
GB
∂
Ω∂−∂
∂+∂
∂−+−+
=
∑∑∑
∑
λγ
µλ
          eq. 38 
     term AG              term BG            term CG        term DG         term EG        
 
Equation 38 defines the optimal level of the public production. The first term in the right 
hand side is the price of the public good (r). It corresponds to original Samuelson rule for 
the optimal public provision. Second term AG captures the effect of the self-selection 
constraint. The desirability of mimicking can be affected by regulating the public 
provision14. Term BG is the direct effect for production, which was assumed to be positive. 
                                                 
14 When the true type 1 values the public good more than high ability type, by increasing public provision the 
self-selection constraint can be mitigated (Boadway ja Keen, 1993). 
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Term CG defines how public provision affects government’s tax revenues. The effect of the 
externality is described in term DG. When the shadow price of the externality is assumed to 
be positive, this effect is positive, if the public good and the dirty good are complements. In 
other words, raising the level of public production increases the consumption of the dirty 
good and thus worsens the environmental quality15 (Pirttilä and Tuomala, 1997). The last 
term EG denotes the effect of the endogenous wages. The level of the optimal public 
provision is increased, when 
G∂
Ω∂  is positive, i.e. when an increase in G raises the wage 
ratio Ω and thus decreases the difference between wages. In this case, public provision can 
be used as a part of redistribution policy.  
 
Terms CG and DG can be written with the help of the shadow price as 
( )∑ 


∂
∂−+∂
∂
h h
h
dP
dd
h
c
c G
X
tt
G
X
t ∑ . This term indicates that when public and private goods are 
complements, an increase in public provision leads to a larger consumption of private 
goods and thus increases tax revenues from commodity taxation. However, since the dirty 
commodity creates a harmful externality, the public finance part of the commodity tax, i.e. 
the cost of internalizing the externality, needs to be subtracted from tax revenues. After 
using this term, equation 38 can be written as  
 
( ) ( ) .ˆˆ*ˆ* 12212 GLVVGXttGXtFMRSSRMr
MRS
B
L
h h
h
dP
dd
h
c
cGGBGB
h
h
GB
∂
Ω∂−


∂
∂−+∂
∂−+−+
=
∑ ∑
∑
λλ
        eq. 39 
   term A’G              term B’G                          term C’G                        term E’G        
 
This equation implies that in addition to the ordinary Samuelson rule of optimal public 
provision, there are extra terms affecting the optimal level. The result is in accordance with 
the study of Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997). The 
term E’G in equation 39 is added to this analysis as a result of the assumption of 
endogenous wages. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
15 In the opposite case, when public good and dirty good are substitutes, clearly it would be optimal to 
increase the level of public production and replace part of dirty good’s consumption with a public good which 
is not creating an externality. 
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Consider now a special case where the utility function is separable between goods and 
leisure. This assumption would make term A’G disappear because now mimicker and the 
true type 1 valuate the public good exactly the same. If we make a further assumption that 
utility is also separable between private goods and public good, also term C’G would cancel 
out to zero. However, even these assumptions are not enough to make the Samuelson rule 
to apply. There are still left terms B’G indicating the effect of production side and E’G as a 
result of endogenous wages.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the optimal tax policy in the presence of a harmful externality under an 
assumption of endogenous wages. The government, restricted by a self-selection constraint, 
has both environmental and redistributional objectives. An essential term defining the 
optimal taxes is the social valuation of the externality. This valuation consists of 1) direct 
and indirect effects on consumers depending on marginal willingnesses to pay to avoid the 
externality, 2) direct effect on producers as a result of the externality’s influence on 
production 3) the labour market effect influencing indirectly both producers and consumers 
through the adjustment of the wage ratio, 4) tax revenue change affecting the government 
and 5) an environmental feedback parameter. Both direct effects increase the valuation of 
the externality implying its harmfulness for both consumers and producers. The self-
selection effect has a negative effect on the social valuation of the externality when 
environmental quality and leisure are complements. This means that the environmental 
deterioration discourages mimicking and promotes government’s redistributional goals. An 
interesting result is that in the consumer side the direct effect and the self-selection effect 
have opposite signs, i.e. environmental and redistributional objectives are inconsistent 
whereas in producer side the direct effect and the labour market effect have both positive 
signs denoting that contributing environmental aims promotes also redistribution.    
   
The effective marginal tax rates look pretty much the same as in the case of exogenous 
wages. Introducing the externality increases both types’ effective marginal tax rates when 
the dirty good is a normal good and a substitute with leisure. The extra term indicating the 
effect of the endogenous wages decreases the effective marginal tax rate of the high 
productivity worker and raises the one of the low productivity worker. In the optimal 
 20 
  
commodity taxation Dixit’s principle of targeting continues to hold: only the dirty good’s 
tax includes the externality internalizing part, which is equal to the social valuation of the 
externality and enters additively the tax rate.  
 
The next step is to widen this analysis by assuming that the low productivity type workers 
have a different vulnerability with respect to the externality. This assumption will give yet 
another dimension to analyze the externality’s effect on optimal taxation. Also 
determination of the generality of principle of targeting is an interesting area of further 
research. 
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